It seemed simple enough: if the Americans could just bring enough footballs, volleyballs, and bookbags to Afghan kids, their parents would love them some foreigners. And if the Americans built enough schools, health clinics, and roads, then all the parents would love all the foreigners all the time. Unfortunately none of the Afghans got a copy of the Petraeus Bible. So that didn’t go quite like anyone had planned.
Elders hand a child a volleyball during a humanitarian distribution event conducted by Soldiers serving with the 4th Kandak, 2nd Mobile Strike Force, 205th Corps, Afghan National Army in the village of Miragul Kalay, Kandahar province, Afghanistan, June 11. The ANA visited the village to distribute humanitarian aid and promote lasting relationships with people in the area. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Whitney C. Houston)
And now that the Americans are leaving, they want to make sure the Afghan security forces get on board with the balls and books delivery programs.
The 4th Kandak, 2nd Mobile Strike Force, 205th Corps, Afghan National Army, put a good foot forward by handing out work boots, volleyballs, toys and clothing.
For so many good reasons.
“These humanitarian aid missions serve as a partnership between the ANA and the population, and that partnership will assist them in the future to keep Afghanistan a safe place,” said Staff Sgt. Matthew Roshell, a Shrewsbury, Pennsylvania, native, serving as section sergeant for 1st Platoon, Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Inf. Brigade Combat Team, 4th Inf. Division.
This is what sucks about the COIN: 
the Americans threw these armed diplomats into situations for which they were completely ill-equipped, and then expected them to effect changes. But the fact is they don’t understand any better what’s going on than their counterparts in Washington.
Maybe the lieutenant’s got a better handle on things.
“We met with the village elders beforehand so as to not show up with humanitarian aid and just hand it out for the sake of handing it out,” said 1st Lt. Jeffrey Lee, a Fairfax, Virginia, native serving as platoon leader for1st Plt., D Co., 1st Inf. Bn., 12th Inf. Regt.
Here’s why these are stupid ideas: if it’s humanitarian aid, showing up with it is self evident. Why? Because someone’s starving. Or their house is washed away. Dropping off volleyballs and workboots is completely pointless. If you have to explain the humanitarian aid, you’re doing it wrong.
“Humanitarian aid is more of a gesture to say we’re here to help and we want to establish some sort of network. So if there ever is an issue in the town, they know who to call.”
Lee went on to explain how, “your gestures mean a lot more than what you can say, so humanitarian aid was the vehicle to establish that rapport.”
This was also a key tenet of COIN: if the Americans give them nice shit, they’ll be super excited and fall all over themselves to tell the ‘mericans about the bad guys. Which brings us to the first problem with humanitarian aid drops as a COIN pillar:
Aid doesn’t mean what you want it to mean
Lieutenant Lee and the ANA kids here think the volleyball’s going to mean a call for help. Except the villager elder isn’t going to call for help. He’s just going to call for another volleyball. If he calls at all.
And if Lee really wants to build rapport, maybe he can do something about the IEDs. Or not blow up another Afghan house. That also helps establish rapport. And having the Afghan soldiers hand stuff out isn’t going to fix things, either.
Why? Because…
Afghans don’t always see the ANA as a national force
Despite what Roshell thinks…
“This mission was pretty effective because it put a small footprint of presence in Mirogul Kalay,” Roshell said. “All of the kids saw the ANA passing out all of the gifts so it put their face on it.”
…or Lee…
“The villagers overall were pretty pleased with the ANA coming down here and setting this up to lend a hand, and it gave an image to the ANA as servants of the nation,” Lee said.
…Afghans see soldiers, any soldiers, as doing the bidding of the foreigners. And in Kandahar, where they’re handing out all the workboots, Afghan military practice is to station folks who aren’t from there. Which makes them, in a country delineated by its ethnic fault lines, foreigners.
It’s true that Afghans feel better about the ANA than they do the ANP (Afghan National Police). It’s also true that it’s more likely for a Tajik or Uzbek to be in charge of a unit in Kandahar. Because then he’s more likely to order his men to shoot the local Taliban (who’s Pashtun).
Since, well, he’s Pashtun. And while folks like Rebecca Zimmerman want to start Hands Across Afghanistan, the truth is little more complex. While an Afghan soldier will speak of defending his country, his allegiances will fall back to what he knows, and that’s going to be something less than national pride. And that translates to the neighborhood he’s patrolling. Which patrolling may not happen again for a while, and that leads to the final reason these HA drops are such a bad idea:
Humanitarian aid like this doesn’t connect people to government
There’s no way that the ANA can do this on a regular basis. The kind of aid that’s being offered may keep people from shooting at the ANA next time, but it manages to subvert other aid processes. The kind of assistance that needs to happen long term needs to come from the civilian government, not the military.
But since the military is modeled on the American concept of buying hearts and minds, this kind of thing will continue. Unfortunately villagers don’t get the concept of sustainability, and they’re more likely to make enemies in the long run. If not enemies, than a population indifferent to whatever goals the ANA and the Americans hope to achieve.
So why do it?
Because of all the feels.
[Tweet “Humanitarian aid needs to be about more than the feels. “]“When you hear of all the sacrifices that people have made over the last 13 years and to be able to see the ANSF succeed in their capacity, your efforts safeguard that effort. It feels good to help strengthen that image they (the ANSF) have with the people.”
Lee means well. Most of the Americans do. And the ANA doing what their American mentors told them to do mean well, too. But good intentions don’t:
- Translate aid into cooperation
- Undo ethnic rivalries
- Connect people to government
If they did, the Americans could have just spent a few billion on volleyballs and workboots and all the rest would have happened on its own. Using whatever pixie dust makes good things happen because the US bought off on a policy so sexy it just had to work. But since pixie dust is as real as Paul Bremer’s conscience, it didn’t work.
The international community has to figure out a way to end this latest interventiongasm in Afghanistan with the kind of grace and poise one normally associates with South Padre over spring break. The Kool-Aid’s all gone, the party’s coming to an end, and all that’s left is that long walk. Here’s hoping the Americans can leave with at least as much dignity. And good luck to the Afghans they leave behind.