This was originally posted in mid-2013. Since we don’t get these reports anymore, figure a throwback here would be nice.
From 2013: This week on the blog I’m looking at the latest Department of Defense report to Congress on the war in Afghanistan. Today? ANSF attrition rates, and why the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF — the NATO mission in Afghanistan) is blatantly trying to hide those numbers from the public. For some background, check out this post, then c’mon back. There’s charts.
And since it’s my jam, here’s a clip that sums up ISAF accountability:
Over the last couple of years, those of us who have been paying any attention at all to ISAF’s reporting of “success” have been subjected to statistical magic that’s only slightly less bad than this:
At least that movie had Alfred Molina, so we could cling to that after Mr. Cage got done being…every character Nicholas Cage has ever played. If you’ve read the previous post in this week’s 1230-ganza, you’d know that ISAF has recently started blaming reporting errors on the Afghans. Right or wrong, it’s at least a different tack for the coalition: rather than having no leg to stand on, at least now they can point to someone else’s leg as the problem.
Where that bait-and-switch falls apart is in ISAF’s reporting of attrition, recruiting, and retention for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), particularly with relation to the Afghan National Army (ANA). I’ve talked about the Afghan National Police (ANP) before, but for the sake of brevity and to keep you, the reader, fresh for tomorrow’s assessment of the Afghan Air Force (AAF), I’m just going to focus on the ANA numbers. If you’re like me and you sometimes tap out not long after the YouTube links in a post, what I said for the Afghan Analysts Network back in February in reference to the December 2012 1230 report sums up where this is headed:
Based on the 1230 report’s figures, the ANA lost 27 per cent of its fighting force to attrition from October 2011 to September 2012. For the same period the previous year, the ANA lost 30 per cent of its personnel due to attrition, which means that 57 per cent of the ANA has been lost to attrition over the last two years. It gets worse: if the time period from March 2010 until September 2012 is considered, that number climbs to 72 per cent. So nearly three quarters of the ANA’s total force over the course of 31 months was lost. Granted, each percentage is drawn from an annual sample, but those lost due to attrition have to be replaced with new troops. Given this current trend, approximately every three years nearly the entire ANA will be replaced with new recruits. By way of comparison, imagine if the US military lost over 30 per cent of its fighting force every year, particularly during wartime; the concern would likely result in the complete halting of combat operations.
Spoiler: it’s not gotten better with this report. Just…less honest. Less transparent to the point where Joseph Mugabe would be impressed. The following are a series of charts depicting ANA strength, recruiting, and retention numbers, starting with the 1230 report in April of 2010.
Couple of things worth noting here:
1. The ANA’s actual troop strength (yellow columns) had exceeded monthly goals (black line) until September of last year, when they started missing monthly end-strength goals in significant numbers.
2. ISAF is no longer reporting the actual figures for each column, instead relying on more wavy lines to, frankly, spin the numbers.
3. Even without those numbers, what’s apparent is that January of 2013 was the worst month to date for attrition in the ANA.
Yes, you did read that correctly: on a graphic that is supposed to show troop numbers, ISAF has virtually eliminated…numbers. Since either a) numbers are hard to type, or b) if they were posted, they wouldn’t tell the story of ANA success that ISAF desperately wants us to hear. I’m going with b on this…lots of b…since they’re not doing it for all security force reporting, but only on this ANA chart. By way of comparison, the following is the graphic depicting the same type of data for the AAF:
Apologies for the image resolution, but at least they’re giving actual numbers. Even though the AAF has some challenges with personnel retention, those issues aren’t nearly as severe as they are for the ANA. And to be fair, ISAF does realize that one of their biggest challenges is attrition ((ISAF’s definition of attrition:
Attrition is defined as “Unanticipated losses, Dropped From Rolls, Killed in Action, Deaths (non-combat), Captured and Permanently Disabled (Exempted).”)):
Attrition within the ANA continues to be a significant challenge, as continued high attrition increases the overall cost of sustaining the force and creates a burden on recruiting and training structures. The ANA attrition rate remained well above the 1.4 percent monthly goal, reaching 4.1 percent in one month during this reporting period. Attrition fell to 2.5 percent in March.
Like I said: attrition’s not getting any better. The ANA is currently on track to suffer nearly 38% attrition over a 12-month period if the current trend continues. So…wavy lines. Lest you think this is just how the Afghans deal with this situation, allow me to retort. It’s been something ISAF has tried to address for years. From the 1230 reports:
Among those “initiatives”? Insha’Allah Airlines, obviously:
Beyond the need for additional trainers, ANSF attrition levels continue to present challenges to force generation. To mitigate attrition, ISAF has expanded incentive programs, including expeditionary pay and a leave transport program for ANSF personnel.
ISAF remains focused on making further improvements, and ANA officials have partnered with NTM-A and IJC to re-activate the Attrition Working Group to determine further potential solutions to reduce the overall attrition rate, beginning with a more robust personnel report that will better define and facilitate tracking of attrition levels. Should ANA attrition rates consistently fail to meet target levels, there is a risk that the Afghan Government will not be able to sustain the training costs incurred to maintain the 195,000 soldier force.
The solution? A commission, naturally:
Since many of the underlying issues with attrition pertain to leadership, the MoD formed an evaluation commission to assess more than 500 commanders, and if need be, replace unsatisfactory leaders from battalion through corps levels. The evaluation commission has identified more than 30 poorly performing commanders; approximately 10 of these commanders have been re-assigned. ISAF continues to work with the MoD to identify root causes and develop initiatives to reduce overall attrition.
So what’s driving the current trend in missing monthly end-strength projections? If you believe ISAF, recruiting’s part of the issue:
Overall, ISAF assesses recruitment within the ANA and ANP to be able to meet desired steady-state end-strength numbers, although more stringent vetting procedures designed to help mitigate the insider threat have slowed the recruiting process to some degree.
But that’s not borne out by the graphic, as the last 4 months of the reporting period, recruiting levels were nearly the same as the first part of the reporting period. And in the case of the ANP, that’s not entirely true, if you believe the Afghans.
Yet, in a sign of the economic downturn which is hitting Afghanistan with the withdrawal of foreign troops and fewer development funds, replacing killed or wounded policemen is the least of the Government’s worries. Each day, hundreds of mostly young unemployed Afghan men queue up at recruitment centres around the country, eager to join.
Why This Matters
There are two issues here: the first is the fact that the ANA is not capable, in mid-2013, of sustaining the end-strength ISAF projects they will need to counter the insurgency effectively. The second is that ISAF is fully aware of that fact, and rather than being transparent about the shortfall, instead uses a numberless chart to tell a muted story of impending tragedy for the Afghan army.
It’s also true that ISAF has long been aware of an impending drawdown of Afghan troops post-2014, a natural reduction that must take place in order for the Afghan government to be able to afford that force. But that reduction is already happening when it’s still projected that the more robust force is necessary to stave off the still-active insurgency.
It is this kind of sleight-of-hand on the part of my nation’s military and civilian leadership that makes me truly sad. Rather than being honest about the state of the war in Afghanistan, they still feel compelled to spin the conflict to a population that’s increasingly not interested in what happens here. This numbers game serves to further the careers of those least affected by this conflict.
Those individuals will dodge the war’s long-term effects on the population of Afghanistan, as well as the fighting men and women of NATO and its partners. It’s not recruiting, desertion, or non-retention that’s destroying the ANA: it’s just dead Afghans. That’s all. But at least the transition is still “on-track.”
Choo. Choo.